



# 2011 Share Incentive Plan

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## Key Messages

# Compensation Philosophy – Overview <sup>(1)</sup>

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- Performance-based compensation culture; key metric is Return on Equity (ROE)
- Compensation has three main components, with the majority performance incentive based:
  - Salary - base compensation;
  - Bonus - cash incentive component; and
  - Equity - Long-term incentive component (LTIP); approximately 25% of total employees in the long-term incentive award program
- Traditionally used long-term incentives as the most significant element of executive compensation
  - Combination of both performance shares and options; 2008, 2009 and 2010 grants performance shares only
  - Represented for 2010 approximately 65% of CEO compensation and approximately 45% of other NEO compensation

(1) See “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” from Notice of Annual General Meeting of Shareholders and Proxy Statement

# Compensation Philosophy – Principles (1)

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- Compensation programs designed with the goal of maximizing shareholder value creation over the long-term. The basic objectives of our executive compensation program are to:
  - attract and retain highly skilled executives;
  - link compensation to achievement of the Company’s financial and strategic goals;
  - create commonality of interest between management and shareholders by tying substantial elements of compensation directly to changes in shareholder value over time;
  - maximize the financial efficiency of the overall program to the Company from a tax, accounting, and cash flow perspective;
  - ensure compliance with the highest standards of corporate governance;
  - encourage executives to work hard for the success of the business and work effectively with clients and colleagues for the benefit of the business as a whole

(1) See “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” from Notice of Annual General Meeting of Shareholders and Proxy Statement

# Compensation Approach



- Strong link between shareholder return and level of Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) vesting
- Each LTIP award vests over a three- (or four- in the case of 2007) year period and each year of that award is tested against the ROE target
- This table demonstrates the direct linkage between ROE and LTIP vesting

| Year                                | 2007   | 2008      | 2009   | 2010  | Average Vested |
|-------------------------------------|--------|-----------|--------|-------|----------------|
| ROE (net income)                    | 21.6%  | 3.3%      | 18.4%  | 11.2% |                |
| 2007 Performance Shares (4 yr plan) | 166.0% | Forfeited | 134.0% | 31.6% | 82.9%          |
| 2008 Performance Shares (3 yr plan) |        | Forfeited | 134.0% | 31.6% | 55.2%          |
| 2009 Performance Shares (3 yr plan) |        |           | 164.0% | 85.6% | 124.8%         |
| 2010 Performance Shares (3 yr plan) |        |           |        | 85.6% | 85.6%          |

- Underperformance against ROE results in a lower, or no, vesting of that year's LTIP, while over performance results in vesting greater than 100%

# 2011 Share Incentive Plan

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- 2003 Share Incentive Plan (as amended 2005) comprised approximately 9.5 million shares, and has funded grants from August 2003 Pre-IPO through Feb 2011
- 2011 Share Incentive Plan requests 3 million shares for future grants
  - Shares that are subject to Awards (or portions thereof) that are forfeited, are cancelled, expire, terminate or lapse without the payment of consideration may be granted again under the Plan;
  - Grants will be at fair market value;
  - Grants may be options, share appreciation rights, restricted shares, or other share-based awards. Since 2008 no options have been granted; the annual LTIP is 100% performance share based; and
  - RSUs, which are not performance based, are used typically for new hires to replace losses from leaving their prior employer



# Financial Tests (ISS)

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- Aspen passes ISS's pay for performance test
- Current level of equity pay annual awards consistent with identified peer company practice and satisfies the ISS annual burn rate test
- This illustrates both Aspen's pay for performance orientation and conservative use of equity
- Towers Watson has demonstrated that our executives' remuneration is market competitive
- The share repurchase program, while financially accretive, has a negative impact on dilution and burn rate test
- Based on Aspen's current understanding of ISS peer group and criteria, Plan will possibly not meet ISS's shareholder value transfer (SVT) test

# 2011 Incentive Share Plan



## Ordinary Shares (as at March 1, 2011)

|   |                  |
|---|------------------|
| Available to grant  | 1,268,165        |
| Options granted and unexercised (excluding 2003 grants) (1) | 1,060,446        |
| Performance shares outstanding                              | 2,364,024        |
| Restricted stock units (RSUs) outstanding                   | 257,671          |
| Additional shares requested                                 | 3,000,000        |
| <b>Total pro forma cost of stock incentive plans</b>        | <b>7,950,306</b> |
| Ordinary Shares Outstanding (March 1, 2011)                 | 70,593,412       |
| ISS: Shareholder Value Transfer (vs. 7.5% allowable cap)    | 11.26%           |
| ISS: Average three-year burn rate                           | 2.37%            |

Aspen's Burn Rate of 2.37% is Lower than Cap of 3.04% of shares outstanding = AHL PASSES

(1) Under ISS's policy requirements, Aspen believes that the 2003 options are excludible from the SVT overhang calculation under ISS' 2008 6 Year+ Option policy